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ABSTRACT. In the final chapter of Speech Matters, Seana Shiffrin argues that
institutions have especially stringent duties to protect speech freedoms. In this
article, I develop a few lines of criticism. First, I question whether Shiffrin’s
framework of justified suspended contexts is appropriate for institutional settings.
Second, I challenge the presumption that the knowledge-gathering function per-
formed by police is necessarily compromised by insincere practices. Third, I crit-
icize Shiffrin’s characterization of the university as involving a complete
repudiation of enforced consensus, and I express doubts about the close connec-
tion between education and democratic legitimation that Shiffrin endorses. Finally,
I raise a problem with the book’s overall argument: even if one agrees that speech
freedoms are necessary for moral development, they also may be threatening to
moral development. The upshot is that the protection of speech should be
modulated in order to account for the potential conflicts between sincerity and
other valuable ends, rather than being oriented above all to sincerity.
In Speech Matters, Seana Shiffrin forcefully argues that we are each
under a moral imperative to nourish, sustain, and participate in
practices of sincere truth-telling.1 This moral imperative arises from
the significance of self-disclosure in enabling us to develop and
flourish as moral agents. In the final chapter of the book, Shiffrin
turns her attention to the duties of truth-telling in institutional
contexts. The philosophical agenda of the chapter can be divided into
two parts. In the first part, Shiffrin argues against any sort of ‘insti-
tutional exceptionalism’ that would permit a relaxation of the duties
of sincerity and truth-telling that otherwise apply to individuals.
1 Seana V. Shiffrin, Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2014). All parenthetical page references are to Shiffrin.
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While she recognizes that there can be some contexts in which the
expectation of truth-telling is justifiably suspended, she maintains
that the valuable aims of institutions do not provide sufficient jus-
tification. In the second part of the chapter, Shiffrin advocates more
stringent duties of truth-telling for some institutions in light of their
ends. In particular, she argues, the police and universities have
special duties not to curtail speech freedoms and not to engage in
deception due to their epistemic aims and social-symbolic function.
Supplementing her argument with careful analysis of U.S. law,
Shiffrin powerfully defends an unusual array of institutional free-
speech policies, such as virtually boundless academic freedom, a
prohibition on police misrepresentation, and the abolition of psy-
chological research that deceives subjects.
In what follows, I develop a few lines of criticism of Shiffrin’s
arguments. Broadly speaking, they all stem from a suspicion that
some valuable aims of institutions will inevitably conflict with duties
of sincerity. Whereas Shiffrin sees the institutional imperative of
truth-telling as non-overridable, I suggest that it may be permissible
– at least in some circumstances – to balance it against other worthy
aims. I develop this idea by discussing the particular institutions that
Shiffrin considers: police and universities. I provide some reason to
doubt that the knowledge-gathering role played by these institutions
is necessarily compromised by insincere practices, pressing Shiffrin to
explain why the pursuit of knowledge requires full disclosure. The
examination of these institutions is meant to illuminate what I
consider to be a tension in the overall argumentative strategy of the
book, which I explain at the end. In brief, even if one agrees that the
protection of speech freedoms is necessary for moral development, it
also may be threatening to moral development. Since this threat is
especially visible in our political life, the institutional context pre-
sents us with stark examples of value conflicts, some of which re-
main unresolved by Shiffrin’s penetrating analysis.
I begin with Shiffrin’s argument that institutions are not exempt
from the duties of sincerity that apply to individuals. She grants that
the value of being able to self-disclose mental contents is not in play
for corporate persons, but she insists that the duties of truth-telling
still apply because institutions are composed of individuals and often
have individuals as their audience (pp. 98–102, 183–185). To tackle
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the institutional context, then, she extends her method for deter-
mining when truth-telling duties can be relaxed in the interpersonal
context (p. 186). The method requires us to first ask whether we can
justify the creation of a ‘suspended context’, i.e., a context in which
the normative presumption of sincerity is disabled. Shiffrin allows
that some suspended contexts can be justified because ‘communi-
cation is… central to the pursuit of other valuable goals, whose
realization may be disserved through expectations and practices of
unexceptional, sober, literal sincerity’ (p. 186). Shiffrin nominates
four valuable goals that insincere communication could serve: hu-
mor, imagination, privacy, and hospitality. Shiffrin accepts a soft-
ening of the truth-telling requirement in service of these goals, as
long as we preserve ‘substantial space for the presumption [of truth-
telling] to operate as a default’ (p. 188).
I want to raise several doubts about the adoption of this method.
First, it is not clear why valuable institutional aims cannot rise to the
level of justifying suspended contexts. Shiffrin seems inclined to deny
this possibility in general: ‘It is an insufficient justification for the
generation of a suspended context that it is generated to further the
pursuit of a good end’ (p. 187). Shiffrin is willing to admit that good
ends like hospitality and privacy may be disserved through expec-
tations of sincerity (p. 186). So it seems at least possible for valuable
aims of institutions to be disserved in a similar way. On the one
hand, Shiffrin could categorically deny this, which would require
defending the view that when it comes to institutions, adherence to a
norm of sincerity has an overriding priority over all other possible
good ends. On the other hand, if she does not categorically deny that
the good ends of an institution can justify a suspended context, then
we need to hear more about what would count as sufficient justi-
fication.2
Shiffrin’s reluctance to consider good ends sufficient appears
motivated by a concern that suspended contexts can have spillover
effects. She says, ‘[If they are to be justified, s]uspended contexts
cannot work on the individuals within such institutions so as to
compromise their habits, expectations, and the personal honest
2 Shiffrin seems to hedge in some places, saying the aims ‘may be insufficient’ to justify a suspended
context (p. 185). But elsewhere she is more strident: ‘Truth-telling is an essential, nonnegotiable activity.
We cannot pursue our other ends to such an extent that truth-telling stops being reflexive or agents
often find themselves in reasonable and serious doubt about whether assertions are presented to be
trusted’ (p. 188).
IS SINCERITY THE FIRST VIRTUE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS?
relationships that facilitate their effective participation in our culture
of presumptive truthfulness’ (p. 194). This proviso seems intuitive at
first, but applying it is nearly impossible. For one thing, it is difficult
to define and delimit a context such that its consequences can be
isolated and assessed against a counterfactual scenario. Even if this
difficulty were overcome, what does it mean to compromise effective
participation? One possible interpretation is that any context in
which participants frequently don’t tell the truth inevitably com-
promises the participants, simply because its regularity creates habits
of untruthfulness that can’t be contained. But this interpretation
seems inconsistent with finding humor and hospitality to be ade-
quate justifications, as Shiffrin does. Presumably even those who
frequently communicate insincerely, such as stage actors and hotel
staff, are able to participate in the broader culture of truthfulness. So
the proviso about spillover effects cannot be interpreted in terms of
the frequency of insincere speech. But until it is clear how we could
know that a given suspended context would undermine the default
presumption of truth-telling, we lack a basis for concluding that it is
unjustified for that reason.3
But there is a deeper problem. The ‘suspended contexts’ method
does not address the full range of issues posed by the institutional
context. Institutions might have valuable aims that justify the
relaxing of truth-telling duties without justifying the creation of a
suspended context – indeed, a suspended context might hinder the
3 A further issue is that Shiffrin seems inclined to categorically dismiss private ends as a source of
justification, as becomes evident in her discussion of the law pertaining to puffery, i.e., exaggerated
advertising. Part of her argument against allowing puffery is that, even if the suspended context serves
some people’s interests, the interests are less weighty because they are private and commercial, as
opposed to public and civic (p. 191). But one can question the relegation of market exchanges to the
category of merely private. Advocates of the free market claim that it has a combined public–private
aim, since a system in which voluntary transactions are largely free from government regulation
advances the general welfare. Hence a free-market system can be said to serve public and private ends
in the same way that a university does, as Shiffrin acknowledges (p. 200). But even if the interests in
question are entirely private, it is unclear why Shiffrin thinks that the private nature of a commercial
interest weakens it as a possible basis for justifying the suspension. After all, commercial interests are no
more private than humor or hospitality, practices that often subvert important public values (e.g.,
aristocratic manners that mark and exclude outsiders). This reinforces the worry that spillover effects
are invoked too readily. Buyers and sellers whose exchanges regularly involve puffery are not so
different from stage actors, and many cultures have customs of insincere posturing that reinforce social
bonds, such as price-haggling or ‘playing the dozens’. See, for example, Elijah Wald, The Dozens: A
History of Rap’s Mama (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). I presume that Shiffrin does not want
to condemn such a range of untruthful practices just because the benefits they produce are private. So
in the end, the opponents of regulating puffery can resist Shiffrin’s conclusion that the interests
advanced by a commercial practice are—insofar as they are private—unsuited to justifying a suspended
context.
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valuable aims. Shiffrin’s method for justifying institutional insincerity
does not address this possibility. Consider an example. In 2016, The
New York Times interviewed then-President Barack Obama on the
subject of his economic legacy. Obama confessed that he faced a
challenge of political communication: ‘It was a delicate balance
throughout 2009 and 2010 to be straight with the American people
about the depths of the problem, how close we were to disaster,
without scaring the heck out of them’.4 Financial panic on the part of
ordinary citizens would have wrecked the economic recovery, and
so Obama adjusted his message accordingly. Call this the ‘ship in a
storm’ scenario: Sometimes the pilot of a large ship in a menacing
storm cannot tell the whole truth to his crew without seriously
jeopardizing their safety. When lives are at stake, and the members
of a group urgently need to act in a coordinated and confident way,
then the duty of truth-telling ought to be relaxed.5
This scenario can be extended to less urgent cases where strict
truth-telling may come into conflict with the pursuit of valuable
aims. Consider an athletic coach focused on winning the next match,
a union leader focused on gaining concessions for workers, or a
diplomat in charge of negotiating an end to armed conflict. Com-
munication is modulated in order to best serve those goals, and there
is a marked difference between what is owed to insiders versus
outsiders. This demarcation could well serve the interests of out-
siders – for instance, the deterrent effect of insincere threats has
helped us avoid nuclear war (thus far).6 Even the everyday role
morality of professionals may justify reducing the stringency of
truth-telling. Suppose a doctor in a publicly funded health system is
considering whether to prescribe an antibiotic to a patient, and the
doctor is concerned about increasing antibiotic resistance in a pop-
ulation. Suppose that the balance of the doctor’s duties clearly
weighs against prescribing an antibiotic to this patient; the patient is
4 Andrew Sorkin, ‘President Obama Weighs His Economic Legacy’. The New York Times (2016, April
28).
5 The classic example of a political leader speaking untruthfully out of necessity is the noble lie
described in Plato’s Republic. See Plato, Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2005). There Socrates
argues that myths have legitimate usefulness as a political remedy, though their use is limited to those
in leadership positions and must serve the good of the city (Rep. 382, 389).
6 The deterrence dynamic is dramatized in Shakespeare’s Henry V. See William Shakespeare, Henry
V, Simon and Schuster (2011). On a quest to retake land to which he believes he has a title, King Henry
secures the peaceful submission of the French town Harfleur with a graphic depiction of his intention to
raze it to the ground (III.iii.1–44).
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healthy and will make a full recovery, although it will take longer
without the antibiotic. It seems that the doctor may permissibly
communicate in a way that obscures the longer recovery time for
the particular patient, in order to avoid suspicion that she may not be
a competent doctor who cares about their health.7 Preserving the
relationship of trust and confidence in the doctor is an important
goal, one that would be disserved by literal truth-telling.8
These sorts of cases, in my view, display the limits of Shiffrin’s
emphasis on justifying a suspended context. For we may still wonder
whether the duties of sincerity can be relaxed for certain valuable
ends, ones that often rely on the preservation rather than suspension
of a normal speech context. So, framing the question in this way
removes our ability to see important instances in which misrepre-
sentation in an institutional setting can be permissible, even though
it isn’t occurring in a justified suspended context.
To make these points more concrete, I want to consider one of the
institutions that Shiffrin discusses: a police force.When it is functioning
properly, a police force advances valuable aims such as peace and the
reduction of fear. It is plausible to think that these aims are not always
best served by literal truth-telling. But Shiffrin strongly disagrees,
indicating that she regards the police – as well as universities, which I
will come to shortly – as institutions whose particular ends and func-
tions demand ‘higher rather than lower fidelity to free speech and
truth-telling’ (p. 223). Her defense of this more stringent standard
serves to highlight the limits of the suspended-context method.
Shiffrin claims that the police play a special role in ‘our scheme of
epistemic moral cooperation’, one that is inconsistent with lying
during interrogation (pp. 197–199).9 She describes the police as ‘at all
times engaged in educating citizens about the law’, and she thinks
that one of their compulsory ends is ‘to act as a source of reliable and
7 Shiffrin addresses role morality, but only to point out that the mere announcement that a context
is suspended doesn’t make it justified. She illustrates this by saying, ‘The doctor cannot shrug off her
duty to speak truthfully by declaring an intention to shirk it’ (p. 192). This may be true, but it does not
show that a valuable end is insufficient to relax the duty of truth-telling.
8 Shiffrin would likely say that the doctor should divulge that she is not acting purely in the best
interest of the patient, and then explain to the patient the justice of prioritizing the health of a
population over an individual, or educate the patient on how his individual interests are bound up with
the whole. But this sort of civic education of individual patients is unrealistic in a clinical context
because of the very nature of the institution—and this is precisely the point.
9 Her examples are appalling, e.g., an officer trying to induce a rape confession by telling a suspect
that the officer had done something like that himself once. However, the impropriety of this behavior
does not need to be diagnosed in terms of the special role of police as epistemic moral authorities.
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trustworthy moral knowledge about the law’ (p. 199). Shiffrin thus
regards the police as epistemic and moral authorities (pp. 198–199).
She claims that there is such a tight link between their investigatory
and educative aims that ‘the police cannot argue that the mere
significance of the end [of investigation] justifies the suspension of
the truthfulness presumption’ (p. 198). But as she notes later, the
success of lying during interrogation depends upon the untruthful
statement’s being presented and perceived as truthful (p. 199). This
observation should prompt us to examine whether valuable aims
might justify police insincerity outside of a suspended context.
Regardless of the speech context, Shiffrin’s view is that police
lying is impermissible because the police ‘subvert their own role
when they misrepresent...’ (p. 198). Why think this? Shiffrin claims
that ‘for the police, collecting and offering knowledge are necessarily
intertwined’ (p. 198). Particular episodes of gathering information do
not require truth-telling, so I assume that Shiffrin thinks the con-
nection lies at the level of practice (p. 199). But this connection is not
necessary, since some deceptive police practices have been effective
at gathering information over time (e.g., discreet surveillance).
Shiffrin indicates that these practices will hinder effectiveness in the
long run because they reduce ‘justified credibility’ (p. 199). But even
if credibility is reduced, it cannot be assumed that a loss on this
dimension would necessarily undo or outweigh the other gains that
are achieved.
In denying that misrepresentation can ever be appropriate for
police, Shiffrin assigns non-negotiable primacy to the educative role
of the police, whereas it is more natural to consider it a subsidiary
function. The role of the police (insofar as they are a functional
public agency), is to aid in law enforcement by investigating crime
and apprehending criminals. The education of citizens through
exchanging information with police is subsidiary and instrumental to
the investigation and prevention of crime. Even if one thinks that the
aims of enforcement and education are on par, this would imply that
they ought to be balanced whenever they cannot be reconciled.
Instead, Shiffrin depicts the police as first and foremost public edu-
cators, such that conveying truths about the law is an overriding and
primary aim of the job.
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Shiffrin’s take on police lying underlines how preeminent she
thinks the duties of truth-telling are, regardless of the other good
ends an institution is pursuing. Surely if this is true anywhere, it
would be in the case of a university. Nevertheless, I am not con-
vinced that Shiffrin’s account adequately grapples with the
inevitable conflict between duties of sincerity and other valuable
aims that universities have. Shiffrin invites the reader to regard a
university as:
…a special sort of collaborative epistemic repository for humanity, a repository that aims to
generate, cultivate, appreciate, disseminate, and preserve our best, sincere understandings of the
domains of important human knowledge and the means, methods, and history of collecting
them, both for the sake of knowledge and for many consequent purposes, long- and short-term.
(p. 200)
This definition is appealing, but it immediately presents a tension
between the activity of inquiry and the acquisition of knowledge. It
should not be assumed that inquiry produces knowledge – after all,
the only thing that Socratic cross-examination can demonstrate is
ignorance.10 A proponent of liberal education might prioritize
inquiry, viewing the university as a place that nurtures individual
development through self-liberation and self-realization. This devel-
opmental outlook may be in tension with speech freedoms, since it
may call for restrictions on speech in order to provide a suitable en-
vironment for engaging in inquiry and dialogue.
In fact, Shiffrin acknowledges that a developmental outlook can
justify speech restrictions in pre-college educational contexts. She
says, ‘[Children’s] early developmental stage may justify their sub-
jection to rather comprehensive forms of compelled education,
which include structured speech activities involving prolonged bouts
of compelled listening and solicited speech’ (p. 105). But an analo-
gous case can be made at the university level. Professors sometimes
reasonably expect students to expose themselves to points of view
that they find abhorrent, for the sake of their moral and intellectual
development.11 Some university classes involve structured debating
assignments, such as being required to orally present arguments on
both sides of a controversial issue. If Shiffrin is willing to permit
10 Gregory Vlastos, ‘The Socratic Elenchus’. The Journal of Philosophy 79(11) (1982): pp. 711–714.
11 I don’t mean to imply that exposure is itself morally neutral, or that the case for exposing students
to ideas that make them uncomfortable must arise from purely civic or political considerations. In my
view, that case must ultimately rest on a judgment about what is good for individuals. Judgments in this
category are highly contextual and rightly belong to instructors, who are best placed to make them on
the basis of their pedagogical and professional expertise.
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these sorts of compelled activities in schools on developmental
grounds, then it is odd to rule out these grounds at a university.
Shiffrin falls back on the ‘special commitments the university makes
to reject the presupposition of a univocal perspective…’ (p. 213). But
it is not clear why these commitments are special, since surely some
schools also make them. If the commitments are occasionally
overridable in schools, then in principle they are overridable in
universities.12
From her knowledge-based concept of a university, Shiffrin de-
rives two imperatives related to governance: A university must op-
pose hierarchy, and it must oppose forced consensus.13 While these
sound appealing, I am not fully persuaded by the defense of them as
absolute imperatives. For one thing, it is not evident that universities
by nature repudiate any form of enforced consensus. Institutional
identity – that is, what makes it no more and no less than one body –
requires some shared recognition of norms of permissible behavior,
including norms for identifying and sanctioning illicit behavior.14 If
that shared understanding is to guide and shape how the institution
conducts itself, there must be some form of discipline, maintained by
the enforcement of institutional judgments (e.g., penalties for aca-
demic fraud, censure for neglect of teaching obligations, etc.).15
Shiffrin’s presentation of these imperatives as absolute gives rise
to a few difficulties. Consider her discussion of the way in which
university decision-making will inevitably reflect corporate value
judgments:
12 In fact, universities allow for a finer-tuned balance of development and freedom than schools do,
though it is still a balance rather than a full reconciliation. For example, the Columbia University
philosopher Michele Moody-Adams explains that she requires students to read about but not write
essays on topics that they find deeply troubling. Ethan Herenstein, ‘Politics, Activism, & the Modern
College Campus: An Interview with Professor Michele Moody-Adams’. The Current (2016). Retrieved
from http://www.columbia-current.org/moody-adams-interview-by-ethan-herenstein.html.
13 Here one might think the distinction between a public and private university becomes significant,
because private voluntary associations are permitted to enforce some basic consensus about the aims of
the institution. Shiffrin limits herself to public universities, and she alludes to having an ‘implicitly
critical stance’ towards private universities that ‘promote particular viewpoints’ (p. 200).
14 For a defense of this ontology of institutions, see John Searle, ‘What is an institution?’ Journal of
Institutional Economics 1(01) (2005): pp. 1–22. For an alternative ontology which also supports my point,
see Frank Hindriks and Francesco Guala, ‘Institutions, Rules, and Equilibria: A Unified Theory’. Journal
of Institutional Economics 11(3) (2015): pp. 459–480.
15 Shiffrin cannot fall back on a distinction between expression related to academic endeavors and
expression related to matters of governance, as she observes later that this distinction is ‘contestable’ (p.
206).
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[M]embers must make decisions, both individually and for the institution, about what topics are
worth pursuing, what scholarship is qualitatively excellent and worthwhile, and which people
and what institutional structures contribute well to [a flourishing] community. These judgments
must themselves be independent and sincere, or else the institution will risk instituting a form of
pre-ordained coordination about ideas indirectly through the selection of its members… These
judgments should not be deployed whenever conceivable, but only to facilitate the construction
and continuation of [a flourishing community]… Judgments allocating structures of power and
establishing substantive priorities that determine the conditions of pursuing and disseminating
knowledge … should be understood, on principle, to be only provisional, periodically up for
questioning and reconsideration. (pp. 201–202).
Shiffrin acknowledges that corporate judgments about what research
is worth undertaking can effectively function to enforce consensus,
and so this risk should be countered wherever possible by treating
the decisions as provisional.16 But this recognition is in tension with
Shiffrin’s insistence that tenure is not problematic. She says, ‘An
appointment’s permanence is designed not to reify a particular
qualitative judgment, therefore, but to safeguard individual sincerity’
(p. 202). In an institution governed corporately like a university,
selection (and rejection) of members has just the sort of permanence
that she worries about. Whether or not it is by design, the
permanence functions to entrench the views of members on the
qualifications for membership – including judgments about what sort
of research is worthwhile.
Because particular viewpoints can come to predominate through
the institution’s governance structures of hiring and promotion, even
governance norms that seem merely procedural can enable the
indirect enforcement of consensus. Insofar as universities operate
this way (and most do), they cannot entirely avoid some de facto
enforcement of consensus about worthwhile research. In light of
this, perhaps Shiffrin could qualify her proposed governance
imperative to make it less absolute: ‘Avoid enforced consensus unless
it sets back the essential (valuable) aims of a university’. But this is
precisely the maxim affirmed by her opponents, who use it to defend
less-robust speech protections. Something similar can be said about
her defense of the absolute imperative to oppose hierarchy. Even the
most problematic university hierarchies bear some plausible con-
nection to the aims of the organization. In the end, it seems that
both the consensus and hierarchy imperatives must be qualified in
16 Some institutional decisions are virtually impossible to reconsider later even if they were vig-
orously resisted at the time, such as starting a controversial degree program (e.g. engineering at the
University of Chicago, business at the University of Oxford).
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some circumstances, and this casts doubt on Shiffrin’s presentation of
the imperatives as absolute.
Shiffrin is clearly right to say that a healthy university culture
requires that academics not be unduly punished for expressing their
opinions, whether on intellectual or organizational matters (p.
206).17 While I agree with the conclusion, I am unpersuaded by the
rationale Shiffrin proposes. She hopes to justify this requirement by
tying it to a particular view about democratic legitimation – one that
assumes that free and open disagreement will ultimately be pro-
ductive (pp. 208–210). I will call this credo ‘democratic romanticism’,
as it envisions a society in which citizens work out their political
disagreements while continuing to treat each other as free and equal.
In this idealized vision, democratic deliberation embodies the only
morally acceptable procedure for addressing and resolving
intractable disagreement, thereby arriving at legitimate political
decisions.18
This view of disagreement is overly romantic because it down-
plays the fact that some disagreement is gravely disruptive and does
irreparable damage, both to individuals and to the quality of delib-
eration. In taking this view, Shiffrin stands in a long line of demo-
cratic theorists who construe public airing of opinions as a uniquely
respectful and productive way of processing conflict and disagree-
ment. This construal implies that collateral damage gets redeemed
by its necessity as a part of the only decent form of popular self-
government.19 This ideal is considerably less appealing in a world
where vicious cyber-bullies exploit the platforms that enable public
reasoning, using them to harass individuals and punish the expres-
sion of certain political viewpoints.20
17 I say ‘unduly’ to allow for instances of libel, privacy violation, etc.
18 The tacit but necessary presumption of this view is that political decision-making fails by some
standard internal to the nature of the activity if it isn’t open, free, and inclusive, but this presumption is
extremely difficult to defend independent of democratic starting points, such as political equality. See
Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008) and Joshua Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, in Deliberative
Democracy, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) pp. 67–91.
19 For further critique of an approach that seeks to ground permissive speech freedoms in the
normative requirements of democratic legitimation, see Amanda R. Greene and Robert M. Simpson,
‘Tolerating Hate in the Name of Democracy’, Modern Law Review 80 (2017) pp. 746–765.
20 While bullies predate the internet, online platforms have made this threat particularly salient. For
a recent example, see Rosa Brooks, ‘And Then the Breitbart Lynch Mob Came for Me’. Foreign Policy
(2017). Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/and-then-the-breitbart-lynch-mob-came-
for-me-bannon-trolls-trump/.
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Even if someone affirms this ideal view of disagreement for
democratic government, it is still not clear why there must be a
connection between the speech freedoms in a democracy and the
speech freedoms in a university. In fact, something like democratic
romanticism seems to operate in the background of Shiffrin’s views
of both. In her discussion of state censorship earlier in the book, she
says that legitimate state action is meant to represent the collective
expression of ‘an inclusive association of independent minds’ (p.
110).21 In the chapter on institutions, she speaks of an analogous
process of democratic legitimation in the university, implying that
the classroom is like a miniature society (pp. 212–213). But the
university and its classrooms have particular aims – for instance,
inquiry and development – that can come into conflict with the free
airing of opinions. Only a democratic romanticist could deny this
tension.
Furthermore, it is not clear that a university stands in need of
public legitimation in precisely the same way that the state does, so
the collateral damage cannot be redeemed so neatly in terms of its
necessary role in the only available route to institutional legitima-
tion. Another route to institutional legitimation might allow for a
restriction on the speech of employees whenever it is egregiously
disruptive to institutional functioning. But Shiffrin rejects this move,
saying that ‘the decision as to what counts as disruptive or inade-
quate work performance should be influenced and constrained by
our free speech commitments’ (p. 207).22 Such a strategy relies,
again, on the preeminence of the requirements of institutional
legitimation, as Shiffrin sees it. In the end, Shiffrin’s arguments about
the university derive from modeling its institutional legitimacy on an
21 A subsequent sentence contains a gloss: ‘… the fair functioning, the value, and the legitimacy of
public democratic action presuppose that community members have (and regularly exercise) the ability
to develop as full thinkers and then contribute their sincere and independently formed perspectives to
the process of collective decision-making’ (p. 110).
22 She explains, ‘The mere fact of doubts or dissension, along with the associated effects of reactions
to them as such… cannot be treated as relevantly disruptive, ‘efficiency-reducing’, or incompetent to a
discipline-worthy degree if, at the same time, we embrace freedom of speech and the more democratic
criteria of success just articulated. In a free speech culture, part of management’s task is to channel
difficult outbursts or dissident expression so that, while they may naturally produce choppy waters, they
do not mature into an unmanageable storm that disables colleagues from adequate job performance’ (p.
208). I agree with Shiffrin that the adoption of such a criterion in Garcetti has led to decisions about
police whistleblowing that are strained and implausible (p. 209). But I would not agree if the implication
is that we should establish a different legal standard of disruptiveness. In my view, any such standard
would invite exploitation by employers and governments, a risk that outweighs its potential to help us
strike the right balance in particular cases.
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ideal theory of democratic legitimation (p. 213). Given how much
work is done by this romantic view of democracy, it seems worthy
of a more thorough defense.
Moving on to the research activities of a university, Shiffrin
advocates a strict prohibition on misrepresentation in academic re-
search. She argues that psychological researchers should not lie to
subjects in order to learn about their behavior in particular cir-
cumstances. As in the case of the police, Shiffrin argues that mis-
representation would be self-undermining. But here the claim might
seem more plausible, since the university’s epistemic aim cannot be
seen as instrumental or subsidiary – it is its raison d’etre. According to
Shiffrin, the rationalization of academic lying in terms of salutary
consequences is in tension with ‘a posture of openness’, and this
posture is essential to ‘ensuring the possibility of discovering and
confirming truth’ (p. 217). But again, the basis for this implicit claim
of necessity is not clear. In fact, the claim is false insofar as we have
empirical evidence that psychologists who employ insincere speech
thereby discover and confirm truths about human behavior. Shiffrin
remains adamant ‘that the willingness to misrepresent facts, pur-
poses, and aims in the service of obtaining and verifying knowledge
calls into question virtually every representation of the academic’ (p.
219). But we lack evidence that psychologists whose experiments
involve misrepresentation are somehow less rigorous in their pro-
duction of knowledge than other psychologists.23
Since the self-undermining claim looks so sweeping, it would help
to clarify its scope by clarifying its basis. It is not clear whether the
critical factor that categorically rules out misrepresentation is (i) that
the institution is public, (ii) that it occupies a position of authority, or
(iii) that its epistemic aims are overriding and non-instrumental.
Distinguishing these three factors matters in order to see what work
they each do in the argument. For instance, it would be implausible
to say that psychological research conducted outside a university, by
a private agency aiming at knowledge about behavior (e.g., market
research), would be self-undermining if it engaged in deceptive re-
search techniques. Market research is a large and successful industry,
23 In footnote 54, Shiffrin cites a study finding that ‘nearly 1 in 10 research psychologists has
introduced false data into the scientific record’ (p. 219). However, we lack information about whether
that behavior is correlated with, much less caused by, administering experiments that involve deception
of subjects.
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and it is hard to deny that it acquires and sells knowledge about
human behavior. Even governments and NGOs find the market
research industry’s services valuable when they seek to advance
socially valuable goals through behavior-change communication.
These agencies may seek knowledge about what advertisements will
effectively counter smoking, reduce unwanted pregnancies, or make
people feel economically secure enough that they don’t turn on their
immigrant neighbors. If misrepresentation is the only way to gain
this knowledge, and it is for a valuable aim that corresponds to
pressing public interests, then the duties of truth-telling to research
subjects ought to be relaxed. And to transpose this point back onto
the police discussion, would there be anything wrong with the
government hiring a private security agency to engage in deceptive
interrogation, if it led to useful knowledge? Shiffrin’s emphasis on the
epistemic aspect of institutions like the police and the university
reveals an unduly moralized picture of how institutions gain
knowledge. This moralized account of knowledge acquisition is
questionable in theory, but also in practical terms. If deceptive
interrogation were to be prohibited, many people might suffer sev-
ere harms (e.g., potential victims of crime). This observation con-
nects to my overarching question, which is why a valuable goal,
when its pursuit by an institution requires insincerity, cannot be
sufficient to relax the truth-telling requirement in some circum-
stances.
Shiffrin admits that complying with strict truth-telling norms is
costly for institutions. She says, ‘Institutional symbols… have
importance because they are not empty or cheap. They opera-
tionalize devotion to a value and underscore how precious that value
is, despite the obstacles and costs associated with its achievement’ (p.
222). This social–symbolic argument both concedes that there are
serious costs and insists that the costs can never be allowed to tip the
scales, because institutions like police and universities should be
moral ‘beacons’ for the rest of society. But by this logic, it would also
be inspiring if universities – and corporations for that matter – en-
gaged in global philanthropy, because the fact that they incurred
substantial costs would make it all the more inspiring. No matter
how inspiring some institutional behavior could be as an exemplar, it
should count as a strict requirement only insofar as it pertains to the
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essential mission of the institution. Ultimately, the weight of this
social–symbolic argument depends on first showing that exception-
less truth-telling is essential to the mission.
I close by posing a question that underlies the critique that I have
been pursuing. As I see it, the basic thesis of the book is that robust
speech freedoms are a necessary condition for our moral agency, and
as such, they ought to be legally protected (pp. 86–87, 88–91). While
it is evidently true that speech freedoms are necessary, it’s also
evident that they can confound our moral agency – for the simple
reason that legal protection will end up covering speech that im-
pedes moral development. To offer a mundane analogy: While it is
necessary for us to ingest sugar in order to be healthy, undisciplined
ingestion can confound or undermine our health. To put it ab-
stractly, some activity X can be both necessary for some valuable
goal Y and yet threatening to Y, because X can both enable and
impede Y. However, when considering a scheme of legal rights to X,
the question becomes not only how important X is for Y, but
whether we can modulate the scheme of permissions to X so that it
sufficiently enables Y without confounding Y.
As far as I can see, Shiffrin’s response to this difficulty is to include
a proviso: Speech freedoms must be exercised responsibly, such that
any threat to moral development can be effectively contained. She
often places substantive conditions on what expression is to be
protected, e.g., ‘[university members] should be insulated from suf-
fering negative employment (and educational) repercussions as a
response merely to the fact and content of the expression of their
candid, responsible, supported, sincere opinions’ (p. 213 fn 42). Her
position seems to be that people deserve to have wide-ranging legal
protection to engage in activity X, provided that they will engage in
X responsibly.
When we characterize the activity that is being legally protected
as by-and-large responsible conduct, it is much easier to argue that it
ought not be abridged for any other valuable ends. In that case, the
contours of the legal protection would hug the boundaries of
responsible exercise, like a licensing scheme. As in the case of other
activities that we protect through licensing (such as driving), the
scheme of permissions is modulated to balance the benefits of
engaging in the activity with the risks of harm to others, and the
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permissions can be curtailed upon evidence of irresponsible behav-
ior. But now we seem to have abandoned one important motivation
for legally protecting speech: To liberate the thinker to speak their
mind freely, which is one of the constitutive aspects of developing
their individual moral agency as well as that of others. Thus, if
speech freedoms are to fulfill their constitutive moral role, they must
provide the individual with some relief from the endless burden of
assessing whether her speech might lead to negative consequences.
In this sense, speech’s claim to be a protected activity is only tenu-
ously related to whether it is exercised responsibly – legally pro-
tecting speech is less like a license and more like a right.
However, it appears that Shiffrin’s account tacitly conditionalizes
the legal protection of speech on an expectation of responsible
exercise. As noted above, she seems to deny that institutional aims
can be served by insincerity or disserved by sincerity. This sweeping
denial suggests that truth-telling’s negative consequences have been
suitably metabolized by Shiffrin’s latent proviso of responsible
exercise. Nevertheless, speech freedoms often are not exercised
responsibly, and in institutional settings the consequences can be
grave. Insofar as Shiffrin’s account relies on this proviso, it sidesteps
this difficult issue.
In light of this unresolved tension, one might be tempted to think
that there is nothing special that we can learn from the institutional
context about the relationship between speech freedoms and moral
agency. But I have argued that some morally valuable ends – ones
that we pursue through institutions – may be set back by robust
speech protection within those institutions. If this is right, then
institutional contexts show us how robust speech freedoms can
undermine the very moral development that they are meant to
enable. For this reason, institutional contexts highlight the down-
sides of elevating sincerity above all other values in our regulation of
speech. The upshot is that the legal protection of speech within
institutions should be modulated in order to account for the
potential conflicts between sincerity and other valuable ends, rather
than being oriented above all to sincerity. Ultimately, when it comes
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to regulating speech, we cannot afford to treat sincerity as the first
virtue of institutions.
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